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Abstract—Higher shares of electricity generation from renew-
able energy sources and market liberalization is increasing uncer-
tainty in power systems operation. At the same time, operation is
becoming more flexible with improved control systems and new
technology such as phase shifting transformers (PSTs) and high
voltage direct current connections (HVDC). Previous studies have
shown that the use of corrective control in response to outages
contributes to a reduction in operating cost, while maintaining
N-1 security. In this work, we propose a method to extend the use
of corrective control of PSTs and HVDCs to react to uncertainty.
We characterize the uncertainty as continuous random variables,
and define the corrective control actions through affine control
policies. This allows us to efficiently model control reactions to a
large number of uncertainty sources. The control policies are then
included in a chance constrained optimal power flow formulation,
which guarantees that the system constraints are enforced with
a desired probability. By applying an analytical reformulation of
the chance constraints, we obtain a second-order cone problem
for which we develop an efficient solution algorithm. In a case
study for the IEEE 118 bus system, we show that corrective
control for uncertainty leads to a decrease in operational cost,
while maintaining system security. Further, we demonstrate the
scalability of the method by solving the problem for the IEEE
300 bus and the Polish system test cases.
Index Terms—Corrective Control, Renewable Integration,
Chance Constraints, Optimal Power Flow
I. INTRODUCTION
In power systems terminology, a preventively secure system
state refers to a situation in which the power system remains
secure after any credible contingency (typically defined as
an N-1 situation) without any additional control action. A
correctively secure state refers to a situation where additional,
post-disturbance controls might be required.
The use of corrective security has increased over the past
years [1]. On the one hand, the use of corrective actions is
driven by increased uncertainty from renewable electricity gen-
eration, economic considerations due to market liberalization
and operation of the system closer to its limits. On the other
hand, better control systems, more situational awareness and
the installation of devices such as phase-shifting transformers
(PSTs) and high-voltage direct current (HVDC) connections
provide the system operator with new possibilities to control
power flows and react to changes in the system in real-time.
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While corrective control can reduce the operational cost
[2] and is applied routinely in real-time system operation, the
real-time set-point changes of HVDC and PSTs are typically
chosen in an ad-hoc fashion. This is partially due to the
difficulty of planning corrective control actions in response
to forecast uncertainty, as it requires the consideration of a
large number possible uncertainty scenarios in addition to
consideration of contingencies. However, the need to ensure
that corrective control will be sufficient in real-time calls for
efficient ways of modelling both the possible system states
and the corresponding corrective control actions.
Power system operational planning with consideration of
uncertainty has been considered in many different ways, e.g.
[3]–[11], but only few have considered the application of
corrective control actions or the existence of power flow
control devices such as PSTs or HVDC. In [12], [13], a three-
stage optimal power flow (OPF) framework where corrective
control actions are used to ensure feasibility during worst-case
combinations of contingencies and uncertainty was proposed,
and was extended to the definition of optimal corrective
control actions in [14]. The OPF formulation in [15] accounts
for uncertainty and includes corrective control for a limited
number of pre-selected, critical uncertainty scenarios. In [16],
[17], post-contingency corrective control of power flow control
devices such as HVDC and PSTs is applied within a chance
constrained OPF (CC-OPF) framework, which ensures that
the constraints will hold with a desired probability. However,
corrective control actions in reaction to the uncertainty real-
izations have not been considered in any of these works.
In this paper, we extend previously proposed CC-OPFs to
account for corrective control in reaction to both contingencies
and uncertainty. Corrective control for uncertainty differs from
post-contingency corrective control in several ways. While
contingencies are typically low probability, discrete events that
induce large and sudden impacts on the system, uncertainty
realizations occur frequently and develop in a more continuous
fashion (although ramping due to, e.g., sunset or fog can
be fast). These differences impact the time available for
implementation, as well as the type and modelling of control
reactions. However, we refer to both as corrective control,
since they act to mitigate the impact of already occurred events
(as opposed to preventive measures).
We focus on corrective control of HVDC and PSTs, which
are typically controlled by the transmission system operator
and have low cost, as opposed to the use of generation
redispatch, which interferes with market operation and incurs
significant cost. Further, we choose to work with analytically
reformulated chance constraints to account for the impact of
uncertainty, as these offer a transparent and scalable way of
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2ensuring security with a large number of uncertainty sources.
Chance constraints also align well with several methods ap-
plied in industry, such as the probabilistic reserve dimension-
ing applied in ENTSO-E [18] or the definitions of reliability
margins for flow-based market coupling in parts of Europe
[19]. The contributions of the paper can be summarized in the
following points:
1) We propose a framework with combined corrective
control in reaction to both uncertainty and contingencies.
Since uncertainty from, e.g., renewable energy produc-
tion are naturally characterized as continuous random
variables, we propose to model the corrective control
through a continuous, affine control policy.
2) We formulate a chance constrained optimal power flow
with security constraints (CC-SCOPF) based on a com-
bination of the formulations developed in [6], [7], and
extend it to include the proposed corrective control
framework.
3) The CC-SCOPF is reformulated into an optimization
problem with second-order cone (SOC) constraints, for
which we develop an efficient solution algorithm. The
proposed algorithm is based on solving a sequence of
second-order cone programs (SOCPs), which in our case
outperforms the cutting-plane algorithm proposed in [7].
The benefits of the proposed CC-SCOPF are demonstrated in
a case study based on the IEEE 118 bus system. The results
show that corrective control in reaction to uncertainty can
reduce operational cost, while maintaining system security.
Further, we demonstrate and discuss the scalability of the
method in a case study including both the IEEE 300 bus test
system and the large-scale Polish test case with 2383 buses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the general framework of corrective control,
based on a generic power flow controller. The power system
modelling, including uncertainty and corrective control, is
described in Section III. Section IV provides the complete
CC-SCOPF formulation and discusses the reformulation of the
chance constraints. Details of the sequential SOCP algorithm
are given in Section V. The case study for the IEEE 118
bus system is included in Section VI, while Section VII
demonstrates and discusses scalability of the method on larger
test cases. Section VIII summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. MODELLING FRAMEWORK FOR CORRECTIVE CONTROL
In this paper, we consider corrective control as a means to
handle transmission line congestion. We distinguish between
two types of corrective control: Corrective control to handle
contingencies and corrective control to handle forecast uncer-
tainty. In the following, we present how we model corrective
control for a generic power flow controller, which changes set-
point in response to transmission line outages or fluctuations in
the power injections. Corrective control for generation outages
is not considered here, but can be incorporated within the pro-
posed modelling framework. Modelling considerations related
specifically to HVDC and PSTs, as well as how the corrective
control influences the power flows on the transmission lines,
are given in Section III.
We denote vectors by lower case letters, e.g., pG, ω.
The components of the vectors are denoted by using lower
case subscripts, i.e, the ith component of pG is denoted by
pG,i. Matrices are denoted by upper/lower bold case letters,
α,M, and α(i,·),α(·,i) denote the ith row and column of α
respectively. Index i refers to generators, while index ij refers
to lines.
A. Modelling Corrective Control for Contingencies
Post-contingency control is modeled as a change in the set-
points of power flow control devices (such as the flow across
HVDC connection or the phase angles of PSTs) following
an outage. Since outages can be characterized as a set of
discrete events, we model the set-point changes by introducing
additional optimization variables δij in for every outage as in
[2], [16]. The set-point of a power flow controller following
the outage of line ij is thus given by
p˜i(ij) = pi + δij , (1)
where pi, p˜i(ij) represents the pre- and post-contingency set-
points, respectively, and δij represents the set-point change
following the contingency.
B. Modelling Corrective Control for Forecast Uncertainty
While post-contingency corrective control describes reac-
tions of the controllers to an outage after the outage hap-
pens, corrective control for uncertainty describes reactions of
the controllers after the uncertainty has realized. We model
these corrective control actions through affine control policies,
where the controllers adjust their set-point proportional to the
forecast error. The controller set-points, including corrective
control for forecast uncertainty, are given by
p˜i(ω) = pi +αω, (2)
where pi, p˜i(ω) represents the scheduled and real-time con-
troller set-points, and the vector ω denotes the random fluctu-
ations. The matrix α defines the response of the controllers,
and control parameters α are subject to optimization.
Restricting the corrective action to follow a linear response
leads to solutions that have higher cost than if we use, e.g.,
an arbitrary function or define optimal set-points based on
specific uncertainty scenarios. However, representing arbitrary
functions or a reasonable set of uncertainty scenarios within
an optimization problem is challenging, and negatively af-
fects scalability to large systems. Therefore, while an affine
response policy restricts the ability to react, it also has several
advantages. First, it allows us to optimize over the corrective
control actions without compromising computational tractabil-
ity. Second, a policy-based response allows us to treat the
fluctuations as continuous variables (as opposed to a represen-
tation through a finite number of scenarios). Third, it provides
a control policy which can be easily implemented by the
TSO. Fourth, even if the policy is not directly implemented,
it guarantees that a feasible solution will exist.
Affine policies have been utilized within chance constrained
and robust models for the optimal power flow problem with
uncertainty, e.g. [5]–[9], to model the continuous activation
3of reserves through a mechanism similar to the automatic
generation control (AGC). The approach taken in this paper
differs from previous work in two important aspects. First,
the affine control policies defined previously were used to
balance the grid (by controlling generation), while we focus on
corrective power flow control for congestion management (by
controlling HVDC and PSTs). Second, previously proposed
policies focused on balancing the overall power mismatch
without consideration of the location of the fluctuations in the
grid. Since we apply corrective control to manage power flows
and congestion, the specific location of both the fluctuations
and the control reactions in the grid matters. We therefore
define control parameters α(i,j) for each pair of controller i
and uncertainty source j, such that the controllers can react to
fluctuation ωj based on its location in the grid.
C. Combined Corrective Control
Assuming that each controller is able to provide corrective
control for both contingencies and forecast uncertainty, we
obtain the combined corrective control policy,
p˜i(ω, ij) = pi +αω + δij . (3)
Note that the reaction to forecast uncertainty is decoupled
from the reaction to contingencies, i.e., α does not depend on
whether the system is in post- or pre-contingency state. This
is because the number of additional control variables would
otherwise be very significant and difficult to handle, both for
the optimization and for implementation in real-time operation.
D. Use of Corrective Control in Real-Time Operation
The corrective control actions δij ,α are necessary to ensure
secure system operation in real time. The post-contingency
corrective control actions δij can be made available to the
operator in form of a look-up table, such that they can be
implemented fast following a contingency. The corrective
control actions due to uncertainty, defined by a combination
of the real time realization of the fluctuations ω and the con-
trol parameters α, can be implemented either as continuous,
automatic adjustments (e.g., similar to AGC control) or as a
manual change in set-points which is implemented only when
a constraint violation occurs in the system.
While restricting the response to an affine policy allows for
a tractable day-ahead OPF, we can implement any reaction in
real-time operation. In real time the uncertainty ω is known,
and the operator can rerun the SCOPF as a deterministic
problem. The set-points of the HVDC and PSTs can then
be optimally chosen based on the current operating point.
Since the real-time control is more general than the affine
policy, we solve an SCOPF with less restrictive constraints,
extending the feasible space. In this regard, applying an affine
policy in operational planning guarantees feasibility in real
time operation.
III. POWER SYSTEM MODELLING
In this section, we present details about the power system
modelling. We consider a power system where N , L is the set
of nodes and lines, respectively, and the number of nodes and
lines are given by |N | = m and |L| = l. The set of nodes with
uncertain demand or production of energy is given by U ⊆ N .
The fluctuations in the demand or production at any given
node can be due to various sources, such as load fluctuations,
forecast errors for wind or PV or intra-day electricity trading.
The set of conventional generators is denoted by G ⊆ N ,
and are assumed to be controllable within their limits. To
simplify notation, we assume that there is one conventional
generator pG,i, one composite uncertainty source ui and one
demand di per node, such that |G| = |U| = |N | = m.
Nodes without generation or load can be handled by setting the
respective entries to zero, and nodes with multiple entries can
be handled through a summation. The considered power flow
control devices used for corrective control are given by the
set of HVDC connections H and PSTs S, with |H| = h and
|S| = s, respectively. The modelling is based on a DC power
flow approximation. We consider the outage of any single line
for the N-1 security constraints, but leave out lines that lead to
islanding of the system. Generation outages are handled in a
simplified way through a pre-determined reserve requirement.
A. Uncertainty Sources
The uncertainty sources u ∈ Rm are modeled as the sum
of the expected production of active power (e.g., from wind
or solar PV) µ and a zero mean fluctuating component ω:
u = µ+ ω . (4)
The covariance matrix of the fluctuations is denoted by ΣW ∈
Rm×m. Further, the total power mismatch arising from the
fluctuations is given by Ω =
∑
i∈U ωi, with corresponding
standard deviation σΩ =
√
1TΣW1.
B. HVDC and PST Set-Points With Corrective Control
We assume that all HVDC installations are point-to-point
connections such that the power flow pDC is controllable
within the limits p
DC
, pDC . The PST tap positions are
assumed to be close enough for the angle γ to be well approx-
imated as continuous variables, and the lower and upper limit
on the PST angles are given by γ, γ. As outlined in Section
II, the post-contingency corrective control of HVDC and PSTs
are modelled through additional variables δijDC , δ
ij
γ , while the
corrective control for uncertainties are modelled through the
matrices αDC ∈ Rh×m, αγ ∈ Rs×m, respectively. The set-
points of the HVDC and the PSTs with corrective control are
thus given by
p˜DC,i(ω, ij) = pDC,i + δ
ij
DC,i −αDC(i,·)ω, ∀i∈H,ij∈{0,L},
(5)
γ˜DC,i(ω, ij) = γi + δ
ij
γ,i −αγ(i,·)ω, ∀i∈S,ij∈{0,L}, (6)
where ij = 0 refers to the set-points in the pre-contingency
state where δ0DC,i = δ
0
γ,i = 0.
4C. Power Balance and Generation Control
One of the main tasks in power system operation is to ensure
balance between consumed and produced power at all times.
Here, we split the modelling of the power balance into the
case with and without deviations ω from the schedule. For the
base case (with ω = 0 and no outages), we enforce the nodal
power balance constraints,
pG − d+ µ+CDCpDC = BBus · θ +Bγ · γ . (7)
Here, BBus ∈ Rm×m is the bus susceptance matrix of the
system and θ ∈ Rm refers to the voltage angles at each bus.
CDC is the incidence matrix of the HVDC connections, with
-1 at the bus where the connection is leaving and +1 at the
bus where it enters. The matrix Bγ describes the influence of
the PSTs and has non-zero entries only for buses connected
to lines with PSTs. For PST k located at line ij (which leaves
from bus i and enters bus j), we have the following non-zero
elements,
Bγ(i,k) =
1
xij
, Bγ(j,k) = − 1
xij
. (8)
To balance fluctuations ω, we assume that the generators
adjust their in-feeds according to an automatic generation
control (AGC) signal. We base the activation of reserves on
the total power mismatch Ω as in [5]–[9]. In this case, the
generator set-points after adjustment for the fluctuations are
given by
p˜G(ω) = pG − αGΩ, (9)
where αG ∈ Rm is a vector distributing the power mismatch
among the generators, and is subject to optimization. To
ensure active power balance during fluctuations and that the
reserve activation contributes to balancing of the deviation
(i.e., a positive Ω induce a decrease in other generation), we
additionally enforce the following constraints on αG:∑
i∈G
αG,i = 1, αG ≥ 0. (10)
Note that we do not include corrective control by gener-
ators for neither contingencies nor uncertainties. While the
formulation itself can easily be extended by variables denoting
post-contingency redispatch dijG or a more general matrix αG,
generation control is expensive and require careful consider-
ation of how redispatch and balancing is priced. Allowing a
more general matrix αG can however significantly impact the
handling of uncertainty as shown in [20].
Since line outages do not change the power injections and
power balance is maintained during fluctuations due to (10),
the above modelling enforces power balance during all con-
sidered system conditions.
D. Power flow modelling
We compute the pre-contingency power flows as the sum
of the base case flow pij (with ω = 0 and no contingencies)
and changes due to fluctuations ∆pωij :
pωij = pij + ∆p
ω
ij , (11)
The base case power flow pij is given by
pij =
1
xij
(θi − θj) + bγ(ij,·)γ, (12)
where xij is the reactance of lines ij. The matrix bγ ∈ Rl×s
maps the PST angles to the lines where the PSTs are located,
with entries bγ(ij,s) = 1xij if the s
th PST is located at line ij
and bγ(ij,s) = 0 otherwise.
The power flow change ∆pωij is a result of both the
fluctuations ω themselves, the corrective control from HVDC
and PSTs and the balancing by the generators. It is given by
∆pωij = M(ij,·) (−αG11×m + I+CDCαDC −Bγαγ)ω
+ bγ(ij,·)αγω = A(ij,·)ω , (13)
where I ∈ Rm×m is the identity matrix. The matrix M ∈
Rl×m is the matrix of power transfer distribution factors
(PTDFs) [21]. The term in the brackets is the effective change
in the power injections due to fluctuations ω, and the last
term is the direct influence of the changes in the PST set-
points on the lines where they are located. Note that the matrix
A = A(αG,αDC ,αγ) is a linear function of the policies
for balancing and corrective control. By allowing corrective
control of HVDC and PSTs in reaction to uncertainties, it is
possible to influence the change in the power flow and reduce
line congestion.
With line outages, the power flow changes both due to
corrective control actions from HVDC and PSTs, and due
to the change in system topology. The change in the power
flow due to the corrective control actions alone (including the
change that would have occured on the outaged line itself) can
be modelled as
pδklij = pij +M(ij,·)CDCδ
kl
DC +
(
bγ(ij,·) −M(ij,·)Bγ
)
δklγ .
The effect of change in system topology can be accounted
for using line outage distribution factors (LODFs) [21], with
LF klij denoting the fraction of the power flow on the line kl
that is shifted to line ij when line kl is outaged. The flow on
a line ij with outage kl and fluctuation ω is given by
pkl,ωij = p
δkl
ij + ∆p
ω
ij + LF
kl
ij
(
pδklkl + ∆p
ω
kl
)
= pδklij +A(ij,·)ω + LF
kl
ij
(
pδklkl +A(kl,·)ω
)
= pδklij + LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl +
(
A(ij,·) + LF klij A(kl,·)
)
ω.
IV. CHANCE-CONSTRAINED OPTIMAL POWER FLOW
In this section, we formulate the chance constrained optimal
power flow problem based on the modelling considerations
described in Section III.
A. Objective and Constraints
1) Objective: The objective of the CC-OPF is to minimize
the total cost of energy and reserves,
min
∑
i∈G
(
cipG,i + c
+
i r
+
i + c
−
i r
−
i
)
(14)
Here, pG,i are the scheduled generation set-points, r+, r−
represent the up- and down regulation reserves and the cost
coefficients ci, c+i , c
−
i represent the bids of the generators for
providing energy and reserves.
52) Power Balance and Generator Constraints: The power
balance and generator constraints are given by
pG − d+ µ+CDCpDC = BBus · θ +Bγ · γ , (15)∑
i∈G
αG,i = 1, αG ≥ 0, (16)
pG + r
+ ≤ p¯G, pG − r− ≥ pG, (17)∑
i∈G
r+i ≥ R+,
∑
i∈G
r−i ≥ R−, (18)
0 ≤ r+ ≤ r¯+, 0 ≤ r− ≤ r¯−, (19)
P
[−αG,iΩ ≤ r+i ] ≥ 1− G, ∀i∈G (20)
P
[−αG,iΩ ≥ r−i ] ≥ 1− G, ∀i∈G (21)
Here, (15) defines the power balance in normal operation,
while (16) ensures active power balance during wind power
fluctuations and non-negativity of αG. The generator con-
straints (17) ensure that the initial generation set-points in
combination with scheduled reserve capacities r+, r− remain
within the technical generation limits p¯G, pG. Eq. (18) enforce
that the total amount of reserves fulfill a predetermined reserve
requirement R+, R−. Eq. (19) ensure that the generators are
not scheduled to provide more reserves than their ramping
capabilities allow, by enforcing an upper bound on the reserve
capacities r¯+, r¯− for each generator. Eqs. (20), (21) enforce
that the reserve activation requested from each generator can
be covered by the corresponding reserves r+, r−. Since
the reserve activation depends on the fluctuations Ω, these
constraints are formulated as chance constraints, which require
the probability of constraint violation to remain below an
acceptable level G.
Note that all reserve chance constraints depend only on the
total mismatch Ω, which is a scalar random variable. Assum-
ing that we enforce all generator constraints with the same
acceptable violation probability G, the reserve constraints
(20), (21) are jointly enforced, i.e., the probability that none
of the generation constraints will be violated is 1 − G. To
see this, we observe that the reserves of all generators will be
fully utilized when the 1− g quantile q1−g of Ω is reached.
For Ω < Ωˆ1−G , none of the constraints (21) are violated.
For Ω > Ωˆ1−G , all constraints (21) are violated. Using this
observation we have
P
[−αG,iΩ ≤ r+i ] = P [−Ω ≤ r+iαG,i
]
≥ 1− G.
Since there is a non-zero cost c+i associated with r
+
i in (14),
at optimality we will have
r+i
αG,i
= q1−g ∀i∈G .
Hence the joint probability of reserve insufficiency can be
simplified as
P
[−αG,iΩ ≤ r+i , ∀i∈G] = P [−Ω ≤ q1−g] = 1− G.
The violation probability g thus has a direct interpretation
as the probability of having insufficient reserves, which is a
commonly used risk measure in real power systems. In the
Swiss power system, for example, the acceptable probability
of reserve deficiency is 0.2% [22], which corresponds to g =
0.001 for up and down reserves.
3) HVDC and PST Constraints: The constraints enforcing
the upper and lower bounds on HVDC and PSTs, after
activation of corrective control, are given by (22) - (25),
while (26) allows the operator to limit the amount of post-
contingency control:
P
[
pDC,i + δ
kl
DC,i −αDC(i,·)ω ≤ p¯DC,i
] ≥ 1− , (22)
P
[
pDC,i + δ
kl
DC,i −αDC(i,·)ω ≥ pDC,i
]
≥ 1− , (23)
P
[
γj + δ
kl
γ,j −αγ(j,·)ω ≤ γ¯j
] ≥ 1− , (24)
P
[
γj + δ
kl
γ,j −αγ(j,·)ω ≥ γj
]
≥ 1− , (25)
− δklDC,i ≤ δklDC,i ≤ −δ
kl
DC,i, −δ
kl
γ,i ≤ δklγ,i ≤ −δ
kl
γ,i (26)
∀i∈H, j∈S, kl∈{0,L} .
The constraints (22) - (25) depend on the uncertainty ω, and
are thus formulated as chance constraints with acceptable
violation probability . Since  > 0, there will be cases in
which HVDC and PSTs reach their limit and are not able to
continue to provide corrective control according to (5), (6).
This control saturation can be expressed as
p˜DC,i = min
{
pDC,i + δ
kl
DC,i −αDC(i,·)ω, p¯DC,i
}
, (27)
γ˜j = min
{
γj + δ
kl
γ,j −αγ(j,·)ω, γ¯j
}
. (28)
When such saturation occurs, we get different power flows
than expected, and there may be overloading on the transmis-
sion lines, requiring further corrective action. However, our
chance constraints ensure that the need for such additional
corrective action occurs with probability smaller than .
4) Power Flow Constraints: The power flow constraints can
be expressed as
P
[
pδklij +LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl +
(
A(ij,·)+ LF klij A(kl,·)
)
ω ≤ p¯ij
]
≥1−l,
P
[
pδklij +LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl +
(
A(ij,·)+ LF klij A(kl,·)
)
ω ≥ p
ij
]
≥1−l,
∀ij∈L, kl∈{0,L} (29)
where p¯ij , pij are the upper and lower limits on the power
flow, enforced as chance constraints with acceptable violation
probability l. Index kl = 0 refers to the pre-contingency
constraint with LF klij = 0. Different from the limits on
generators, HVDC and PSTs, the transmission limits are soft
constraints from a physical perspective and might experience
violations. The violation probability l is thus interpreted as the
probability of observing an overload or N-1 violation. These
such transmission line violations can either be accepted (e.g.,
if the overload is small or related to an unlikely outage), or
can be handled through additional measures in real-time.
Note that the problem does not include any consideration
of the intermediate post-contingency, pre-corrective control
system state, as described in e.g. [23]. Constraints to ensure
feasibility of this state can however be added without any
conceptual change to the method.
6B. Reformulation of Chance Constraints
The chance constraints in Eq. (20)-(29) need to be refor-
mulated into tractable constraints. Here, we choose to use
an analytic reformulation based on the assumption that the
forecast uncertainty vector ω follows a normal distribution,
similar to the one used in [6], [7]. This choice of distribution
is based on the fact that the chance constraints used are
marginal chance constraints and are one dimensional (e.g., one
constraint for each line flow) and depend on the weighted
sum of the high dimensional random vector ω. With the
projection of a high dimensional vector onto a one dimensional
constraint, arguments similar to the central limit theorem can
be invoked [24], despite the fact that the individual uncertainty
sources ω may not be normally distributed.
1) Reformulated Constraints: With the normality assump-
tion, Eqs. (20)-(29) can be reformulated into the following
constraints:
αG,iΦ
−1(1− G)σΩ ≤ r+i , (30)
αG,iΦ
−1(1− G)σΩ ≥ −r−i , (31)
pDC,i + δ
kl
DC,i + Φ
−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTDC(i,·) ‖2≤ p¯DC,i
(32)
pDC,i + δ
kl
DC,i − Φ−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTDC(i,·) ‖2≥ pDC,i
(33)
γj + δ
kl
γ,j + Φ
−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTγ(j,·) ‖2≤ γ¯j (34)
γj + δ
kl
γ,j − Φ−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTγ(j,·) ‖2≥ γj (35)
pδklij + LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl + (36)
Φ−1(1− l) ‖ Σ1/2W
(
A(ij,·) + LF klij A(kl,·)
)T ‖2≤ p¯ij
pδklij + LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl − (37)
Φ−1(1− l) ‖ Σ1/2W
(
A(ij,·) + LF klij A(kl,·)
)T ‖2≥ −p¯ij
The generator constraints are linear since they only depend on
the total power mismatch Ω with standard deviation σΩ [10].
The remaining constraints (32) - (37) are Second Order Cone
(SOC) constraints, which are convex for  ≤ 0.5 [7].
2) Exploiting Symmetry of SOCs: Each pair of upper and
lower SOC constraints in (32)-(37) can be reduced to a pair
of linear constraints and a single SOC constraint by exploiting
the symmetry of the normal distribution [7]:
pDC + δ
kl
DC + sDC ≤ pmaxDC (38)
pDC + δ
kl
DC − sDC ≥ pminDC (39)
sDC,i ≥ Φ−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTDC(i,·) ‖2, ∀i∈H (40)
γ + δklγ + sγ ≤ γmax (41)
γ + δklγ − sγ ≥ γmin (42)
sγ,j ≥ Φ−1(1− ) ‖ Σ1/2W αTγ(j,·) ‖2, ∀j∈S (43)
pδklij + LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl + s
kl
ij ≤ pmaxij , ∀ij∈L, kl∈{0,L} (44)
pδklij + LF
kl
ij p
δkl
kl − sklij ≥ −pmaxij , ∀ij∈L, kl∈{0,L} (45)
sklij ≥ Φ−1(1− l) ‖ Σ1/2W
(
A(ij,·) + LF klij A(kl,·)
)T ‖2 (46)
The above reformulation cuts the number of SOC constraints
in half and thus improves efficiency. Note that the SOC terms
(40), (43), (46) are always positive, and introduce a tightening
of the original, deterministic constraints.
3) Non-Normal Uncertainty: For cases where the assump-
tion of a normal distribution is not justified, an analytical
reformulation can be still be obtained even when only limited
knowledge of the distribution is available [11], [25]. For
example, a reformulation based on the Chebyshev inequality
only requires knowledge of the mean and covariance of ω.
These reformulations result in SOC constraints similar to (38)-
(46), and can be easily used within the suggested framework.
However, the distributionally robust reformulations can be
overly conservative [25], leading to unnecessarily high cost or
infeasibility. Instead, we suggest to use the normal assumption
(as described above) combined with out-of-sample testing.
V. SOLUTION ALGORITHM
The full OPF problem with security and chance constraints
in Section IV is a Second Order Cone Program (SOCP), with
the SOC constraints given by Eq. (40), (43) and (46). The
problem has a large number of linear and SOC constraints,
due to consideration of both the pre- and post-contingency
situations. Although the SOC constraints are convex, it has
been observed in the literature [7] that attempting to solve
the entire optimization problem at once by using a non-linear
SOCP solver can result in unacceptably long convergence
times and run into numerical difficulties. The state of the art
method in the literature for solving such chance constrained
OPF problems is the sequential outer approximation cutting
planes algorithm [7]. In this algorithm, a relaxed version of
the problem is solved by eliminating all the SOC constraints.
Then the relaxation is successively tightened using a se-
quence of polyhedral outer approximations obtained by adding
separating hyperplanes (cutting-planes) to the violated SOC
constraints until the desired accuracy is reached. The success
of the algorithm relies on exploiting three salient properties
prevalent in the CC-OPF [7]: (i) only a small fraction of the
non-linear chance constraints (SOCs) are active at optimality,
and these correspond to critical/congested lines, (ii) each SOC
term depends only on a limited number of decision variables,
and (iii) linear programming solvers have better speed and
stability compared to non-linear solvers.
However, there are some critical differences in the features
of the CC-SCOPF considered in this paper that makes the
cutting-plane algorithm unsuitable:
Feature 1: Due to the SOC constraints for the HVDC
and PSTs, that are often tight at optimality, as well as the
security constraints for the lines, more constraints must be
approximated through polyhedral constraints.
Feature 2: Each SOC term, in particular the SOC terms
for the lines, depend on a large number of decision variables
since αG, αDC , αγ are potentially large matrices. For those
constraints, we found that the cutting-plane algorithm requires
a large number of iterations to obtain a good polyhedral
approximation and a feasible solution within acceptable toler-
ance. This implies that the optimization problem needs to be
solved a many times, and that a significant amount of memory
is required to store the large and increasing number of linear
constraints.
7Feature 3: Due to security constraints, there is a very large
number of SOCs present in the problem. Evaluating the SOC
constraints at any given candidate solution is therefore time
consuming. Since the cutting-planes algorithm requires a large
number of iterations with an SOC evaluation in each iteration,
the problem solves very slowly.
To overcome these difficulties and obtain an efficient im-
plementation, we develop a sequential SOCP algorithm based
on a constraint generation process customized to our problem.
As in [7], we first solve a relaxed version of the problem
involving only linear constraints. Instead of adding cutting-
planes, we then add the full SOC terms for the most violated
constraints. We continue solving a sequence of SOCPs until all
constraints are satisfied, reaching the globally optimal solution
of the original problem. The sequence in which the violated
constraints are added has a significant impact on the solving
time, and needs to be carefully chosen. In the following we
describe the details of the algorithm and the reasoning behind.
Preprocessing: Solving the SCOPF Without Uncertainty
As a pre-processing step, we solve the SCOPF without con-
sideration of uncertainty. This allows us to obtain a fast, first
estimate of the active constraints.
Step 1: Solving the CC-OPF Without Security Constraints
(a) We first solve a base case problem consisting of the power
balance and generator constraints (15)-(19), (30), (31),
the full PST and HVDC constraints (38) - (43) as well
as the linear pre-contingency line constraints (44), (45).
Since most of the SOC constraints for HVDC and PST are
tight and there are few of them (i.e., no additional SOC
terms for the security constraints), adding the full SOC
upfront eliminates unnecessary iterations. In addition, the
SOC terms belonging to the pre-contingency constraints
violated in the SCOPF are added.
(b) The line SOC constraints for the base case, i.e., (46) with
kl = 0 are then checked for violations, and the most
violated ones are added to the problem with a warm start
from the previous iteration. This process is repeated until
all the base case constraints are satisfied.
Step 2: Solving the Full CC-SCOPF With Security Constraints
We check for violation of the security constraints and add them
sequentially using warm start. This part of the algorithm runs
in three phases:
(c) In the first iteration, we add all post-contingency con-
straints that were active in the SCOPF without uncer-
tainty, as these most likely will be active in the CC-
SCOPF as well. We include both the linear constraints
(44), (45) and the corresponding SOC constraint (46) to
the problem.
(d) After the first iteration, we check for violation of only the
linear security constraints (44), (45), which is much faster
than evaluating the full SOC constraints. However, since
the SOC constraint implies a tightening of the linear con-
straint, a violation of the linear constraint almost always
means that the corresponding SOC is violated as well. For
the most violated constraints, we therefore add both the
linear constraints (44), (45) and the corresponding SOC
constraint (46) to the problem. This process is repeated
until all the linear security constraints are satisfied.
(e) We then check for the violated SOC terms for the line
security constraints (46), and add the most violated ones
to the problem. As mentioned in Feature 3, the number
of post-contingency SOCs are rather large, and hence
inefficient to evaluate. However, we observe that this
stage of the algorithm only requires few iterations until
all constraints are satisfied, since most violated security
constraints were added in (d).
To reduce the computational time involved in each itera-
tion (d), we do a pre-screening of the SOC terms based
on the LODF matrix. Even though most LF klij are non-
zero, most are very small < 1e − 3. By evaluating the
post-contingency SOC constraints only for those pairs
ij and kl where LF klij exceeds a certain threshold, the
number of evaluations can be significantly reduced while
maintaining acceptable accuracy.
Finally, we check whether the current solution violates any of
the pre-contingency constraints. If yes, we restart from (b).
Otherwise, the algorithm is terminated and a globally optimal
solution which satisfies all the constraints of the full problem
has been found. In all encountered cases, only one pass of the
algorithm was required to find an optimal solution without
requiring to return to (b).
VI. CASE STUDY - IEEE 118 BUS SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the benefits of corrective control
based on a case study for the IEEE 118 bus system. The
scalability of the proposed method and the sequential SOCP
algorithm is demonstrated in the next section.
A. IEEE 118 Bus Test System
We use the IEEE 118 bus test system as defined in [26],
with the following modifications. Both load and maximum
generation capacity are scaled by a factor of 1.25, and the
minimum generation capacity is set to zero. The system loads
are interpreted as a mix between load and renewable energy
sources connected at a lower voltage level. Instead of adding
uncertain in-feeds to the system, we assume that all 99 loads
fluctuate around their forecasted consumption. The standard
deviation σ of each load is equal to 10% of the forecasted
consumption. As shown in Fig. 1, the system is divided into
three zones. We assume that fluctuations within a zone are
correlated with ρ = 0.3, that fluctuations in different zones are
uncorrelated. For the chance constraints, we apply l =  =
0.01 for transmission line, HVDC and PST constraints. For the
generator constraints, we use G = 0.001, which corresponds
to the acceptable probability of having insufficient reserves in
the Swiss power system.
We assume that there are 3 PSTs and 3 HVDC connections
installed in the system, as shown in Fig. 1. Details for each
HVDC connection are listed in Table I. The PSTs are installed
on lines 41, 167 and 54, with maximum tap positions ±30◦.
The upper bounds on the post-contingency control for HVDC
and PSTs are set to δ
ij
DC = 0.25 pDC and δ
ij
γ = 0.25 γ.
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Fig. 1. IEEE 118 bus system with 3 Zones. The the lines with PSTs are
marked in red, while HVDC connections are drawn in green.
TABLE I
IEEE 118 BUS SYSTEM - HVDC CONNECTIONS
HVDC connection HVDC 1 HVDC 2 HVDC 3
From - To Bus 38 - 65 104 - 62 12 - 17
Replaced Line 96 - 20
Capacity [MW] 500 200 175
The total required down-reserves is set to R− = Φ−1(1 −
G)σΩ, which ensures that the total fluctuation Ω will be cov-
ered with probability 1− G. The total amount of up-reserves
R+ is required to cover the same fluctuation or the maximum
generation outage, whichever is larger: R+ = max{pG, R−}.
This reserve dimensioning ensures that a similar amount of
reserves are procured for the chance-constrained and deter-
ministic formulations we will compare. To ensure ramping
constraints, the upper bound on provision of reserves from
each generator is set to 20% of total generation capacity, i.e.
r+ = r− = 0.2pG.
To analyze the performance of the method, we use a Monte
Carlo simulation. We sample the uncertainty realization ω,
calculate the power flows and record the number of constraint
violations. To test the algorithm for different types of uncer-
tainty, we run two simulations with 2000 samples of ω each:
First, we use uncertainty data which correspond to our
assumptions, and draw samples from a multivariate normal
distribution with mean µ = 0 and covariance matrix ΣW .
Second, we run out-of-sample tests based on 1 year of
real system data from the Austrian Power Grid (APG). The
deviations are defined based on the difference between the
the so-called DACF (Day-Ahead Congestion Forecast) and the
snapshot (the real-time power injections) for all hours and
buses with available data (8492 data points for 28 buses).
Splitting the data into four three-month periods, we obtain
2000 data samples for each of the 99 buses. The samples are
then scaled to fit the assumed covariance matrix ΣW and mean
µ = 0. This corresponds to the case where we have a good
estimate of the mean and covariance, but do not know the full
underlying distribution.
We implement the sequential SOCP algorithm in Julia with
JuMP [27], and solve the problem using MOSEK [28]. With
this set-up, the solution is obtained within a few minutes on
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Fig. 2. Breakdown of the cost for the five OPF formulations (a) - (e). The
costs are normalized by the cost of the OPF (a).
a laptop.
B. Numerical Results
To demonstrate the benefits of corrective control, we com-
pare five different solutions:
(a) The OPF does not consider uncertainty (i.e., ΣW = 0)
or constraints related to outages.
(b) The SCOPF does not consider uncertainty (i.e., ΣW = 0)
or post-contingency corrective control (δijDC = δ
ij
γ = 0).
(c) The post-contingency corrective SCOPF does not con-
sider uncertainty (i.e., ΣW = 0).
(d) The post-contingency corrective CC-SCOPF does not
consider corrective control in reaction to fluctuations (i.e.,
αDC = αγ = 0).
(e) The full CC-SCOPF considers corrective control for both
fluctuations and contingencies.
We first compare the cost of the generation dispatch and
reserves (as obtained directly from the optimization), and
analyze the differences. Second, we look into the empirical
number of violations observed in the two Monte Carlo simu-
lations for the normally distributed and out-of-sample data.
Finally, we investigate the impact of corrective control by
comparing the solution of (d) and (e) for different acceptable
violation probabilities  and varying uncertainty levels σ.
1) Comparison of operation cost: The costs of the por-
blems (a)-(e) are listed in Table II and are shown graphically
in Fig. 2, where the costs are normalized by the cost of the
standard OPF. The cost increase is analyzed with respect to
the following criteria [6]:
Cost of Security is defined as the cost increase between
the OPF and the SCOPF, due to the cost of enforcing N-1
constraints.
Cost of Uncertainty is defined as the cost increase between
the SCOPF and the CC-SCOPF, due to the cost of enforcing
chance constraints instead of deterministic constraints.
We observe that the cost of security can be reduced by 0.9%
from (b) to (c), by introducing post-contingency corrective
control. Similarly, the cost of uncertainty is reduced by 0.35%
from (d) to (e), by introducing uncertainty corrective control.
The reduction in cost of uncertainty can be explained by
the better ability to react to the fluctuations in the power
injections. In Fig. 3, the power flow on line 119 after the
outage of line 126 is plotted against the set-point of HVDC
3 for the CC-SCOPF problems without (left) and with (right)
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Fig. 3. Power Flow on Line 119 after outage of Line 126, plotted against
the set-point of HVDC 3 for the CC-SCOPF without (left) and with (right)
corrective control for uncertainty. The red marker shows the forecasted
operating point, the blue points are the realized power flows obtained through
the Monte Carlo simulation and the black lines show the line and HVDC
limits.
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Fig. 4. Values of the corrective control parameters αDC (top) and αγ
(bottom).
corrective control. The red marker shows the forecasted op-
erating point, and the blue points correspond to the actual,
realized conditions as simulated for 2000 samples of ω. In
the case without corrective control (left), the HVDC set-point
remains constant for all uncertainty samples, while the set-
point changes depending on the wind condition with corrective
control (right). The post-contingency constraint on line 119
is one of the active constraints in the CC-SCOPF problems
(d) and (e), and it is clearly seen how the line flow limit
is violated in some cases. However, we also observe that by
introducing the corrective control of HVDC and PSTs, it is
possible to reduce the standard deviation of the line flow, in
this case from 35.2 MW to 19.7 MW. With reduced variance,
a higher nominal power flow can be accepted, which leads to
a reduction in cost.
The response of the HVDC and PSTs to uncertainty is
determined by the corrective control parameters αDC , αγ .
The values of those variables as obtained from (e) are shown
in Fig. 4. We observe that the PST and HVDC react strongly
to fluctuations that are geographically close to where they
are located, and have close to zero entries for most other
fluctuations.
2) Number of Violations and Out-of-Sample Testing: We
run two Monte Carlo simulations based on the normally
distributed and APG data sets, and compute the number of
constraint violations.
To investigate how well our solutions perform in the out-of-
samples test with real APG data, we first look at the empirical
violation probability emp for each separate constraint and
TABLE II
COST AND NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS FOR (A) - (E)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Cost [$] 84924 87880 87108 88713 88418
Violations (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Normal 2000 1729 1712 98 87
Samples (100%) (86.5%) (85.6%) (4.9%) (4.4%)
APG 2000 1697 1655 114 95
Samples (100%) (84.9%) (82.8%) (5.7%) (4.8%)
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Fig. 5. Empirical violation probability emp per constraint with normal
samples (green) and APG samples (yellow) for the 19 violated constraints,
based on the solution for the full CC-SCOPF (e). The black dotted line
corresponds to emp = l = 0.01.
compare this to the accepted violation probability l. Fig. 5
shows the empirical violation probability per constraint for
the full CC-SCOPF (e), with normal (green bar) and APG
(yellow bar) samples. Only the 19 constraints with emp > 0
are shown. We observe that there are four tight constraints
(3, 7, 8 and 10) for which emp ≈ 0.01 with normally
distributed samples. For these constriants, the APG samples
lead to emp > 0.01, indicating that the chance constraint is
violated. However, the empirical violation probability remains
below 2% for all constraints, and below the acceptable 1%
value for the majority of constraints. While the empirical
violation probability will vary depending on the uncertainty
data, this result indicates that a chance constraint approach
based on the normal distribution still significantly reduces the
risk of violations.
In a second investigation, we calculate the joint violation
probability, i.e., the probability that a sample will exhibit a
violation of any constraint. Since each chance constraint in our
problem is enforced individually with a violation probability of
1− and the wind deviations that lead to a constraint violation
differ between constraints, the joint violation probability might
be significantly higher than 1− .
In Table II, the number of Monte Carlo samples which
lead to either pre- or post-contingency constraint violations are
listed for both the normally distributed and the APG samples.
The OPF (a) violates all scenarios, as it neither accounts for
outages nor uncertainty. The two SCOPF formulations without
(b) and with (c) corrective control have violations due to
uncertainty in around 1700 of the samples. This corresponds
to a joint violation probability of around 85%, which is
unacceptably high and clearly shows the need to account for
uncertainty.Both CC-SCOPF formulations (d) and (e) have
violations in around 100 samples, indicating a joint violation
probability of around 5%. As expected, this is above the
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TABLE III
COST OF CC-SCOPF WITHOUT (D) AND WITH (E) CORRECTIVE CONTROL
FOR UNCERTAINTY, FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF  (TOP) AND DIFFERENT
STANDARD DEVIATIONS σ AS % OF FORECASTED LOAD (BOTTOM).
=0.1 =0.05 =0.02 =0.01 =0.001
(d) 87898 88136 88466 88713 89483
(e) 87720 87941 88201 88418 89070
σ=5% σ=7.5% σ=10% σ=12.5% σ=14.25%
(d) 84171 86334 88136 91513 Infeasible
(e) 83991 86119 87941 91022 93063
acceptable violation probability l = 0.01 for each separate
constraint. However, it is still in the acceptable range and
shows that a CC-SCOPF based on separate chance constraints
also effectively reduces the joint violation probability.
The Monte Carlo simulation based on APG data increases
number of violated scenarios by less than 1 % compared to
the normally distributed samples for the CC-SCOPF cases
(a) and (e), indicating that the method performs well also in
out-of-sample tests. We further conclude that the CC-SCOPF
with corrective control (e) is able to provide a similarly low
violation probability as the CC-SCOPF without corrective
control (d), but at lower cost.
3) Influence of the confidence level: Table III shows the
cost of the generation dispatch without (d) and with (e)
corrective control for uncertainty, for different acceptable
violation probabilities  and different standard deviations (in
% of forecasted load). We observe that the possibility to
react to uncertainty becomes increasingly important (i.e., the
reduction in cost is larger) if we want to enforce smaller
violation probabilities or if the level of uncertainty increases.
With standard deviations of 14.25%, we even observe that the
CC-SCOPF with corrective control (e) is feasible, whereas the
CC-SCOPF without (d) is not.
VII. CASE STUDY - SCALABILITY
In this case study, we discuss the scalability of the CC-
SCOPF and proposed solution algorithm based on the run
times for three different test cases, the IEEE 118 bus system,
the IEEE 300 bus system and the Polish test case with 2383
buses.
A. Test System Data
1) IEEE 118 bus test system: For the IEEE 118 bus system,
we use the same data as in the previous case study.
2) IEEE 300 bus test system: We use a modified version
of the IEEE 300 bus test system found in the NICTA En-
ergy System Test Archive [29]. To obtain a feasible SCOPF
case, we increase the line limits by a factor of 5.0 and the
generation limits by a factor of 2.0. All loads above 50 MW,
corresponding to 109 loads and 68% of the system load, are
assumed to be uncertain. Their standard deviations are set to
5% of the forecasted consumption, and the correlation to zero.
We assume that there are 3 HVDC connections installed in the
system, with corresponding system data listed in Table IV. The
PSTs are installed on lines 91, 140 and 174, with maximum
tap positions ±30◦.
TABLE IV
IEEE 300 BUS SYSTEM - HVDC CONNECTIONS
HVDC connection HVDC 1 HVDC 2 HVDC 3
From - To Bus 68 - 198 8 - 18 126 - 145
Replaced Line - - -
Capacity [MW] 900 600 600
TABLE V
POLISH TEST CASE - HVDC CONNECTIONS
HVDC connection HVDC 1 HVDC 2 HVDC 3
From - To Bus 32 - 18 184 - 105 67 - 138
Replaced Line - - 169
Capacity [MW] 500 500 1000
3) Polish Test System: We base our case study on the
Polish Winter Peak test case with 2383 buses as provided
with Matpower 5.1 [30]. To obtain a feasible case with active
transmission constraints, the maximum generation capacity is
scaled by a factor of 2.0 and the transmission line limits by
a factor of 2.5. All loads above 25 MW, corresponding to
157 loads and 29% of the system load, are assumed to be
uncertain. Their standard deviations are set to 20% of the
forecasted consumption, and the correlation between loads to
zero. We assume that there are 3 HVDC connections installed
in the system, with corresponding system data listed in Table
V. The PSTs are installed on lines 130, 240 and 1381, with
maximum tap positions ±30◦.
For both of the above test systems, we choose similar set-
tings as for the IEEE 118 bus test case in the previous section.
We apply l =  = 0.01 for transmission line, HVDC and PST
constraints and use G = 0.001 for generation constraints. We
determine the total required reserve capacities R−, R+ and
the reserve provision bounds r+, r− as described above. We
do not include post-contingency corrective control in either
of the test cases, but solve the CC-SCOPF with corrective
control for uncertainties. The sequential SOCP algorithm is
implemented in Julia with JuMP [27], and solved using Ipopt
[31].
B. Results
The size of each test case is listed in Table VI. Due to the
large number of security constraints, already the IEEE 118 bus
test case has more SOC constraints than the Polish test case
solved in [7]. The problem sizes for the IEEE 300 bus and
Polish grid test cases are one and two orders of magnitude
larger than the IEEE 118 bus system, as measured in number
of constraints, with the Polish test case featuring more than 8
million variables and 8 million SOC constraints.
Table VII shows the run times of the algorithm based
on the current implementation. We have included both the
total solution time, as well as an overview of the number of
SOC evaluations and the total time spent evaluating the SOC
constraints. We observe that a significant part of the solution
time is spent checking the SOC constraints. The pre-screening
of the security constraints based on the LODF matrix reduces
the number of security constraints that we need to check by a
factor of 3. However, for the largest Polish test case, we still
need to evaluate close to 1.4 million SOC constraints.
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TABLE VI
SIZE OF THE CC-SCOPF FOR THE DIFFERENT TEST CASES
IEEE 118 IEEE 300 Polish
Variables 54 000 173 000 >8 mill.
Linear Constraints 70 000 343 000 >16 mill.
SOC Constraints 34 000 169 000 >8 mill.
TABLE VII
RUN TIMES FOR CC-SCOPF FOR THE DIFFERENT TEST CASES
IEEE 118 IEEE 300 Polish
Total Run Time 2min 15s 4 min 44s 4h 20min
Number of SOC Evaluations 2 3 2
Time per SOC Evaluation 8s 27 s 1h 36min
By using the sequential SOCP algorithm, we are able to
keep the number of SOC evaluations very low, with only 2-3
evaluations. While the cutting plane algorithm [7] would solve
the problem faster and more reliably in each iteration, it would
require a much larger number of SOC constraint evalutions,
leading to prohibitively large run times. However, the time
required for the SOC check can be significantly reduced by
more efficient coding and parallelization, and is left as a topic
for future work. This would improve the solution times for
both our solution algorithm and the cutting plane algorithm in
[7].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a framework for corrective
control which involves corrective actions in response to both
contingencies and different uncertainty realizations.
The combined corrective control was incorporated in a CC-
SCOPF with security and chance constraints, to ensure that
the probability of constraint violations does not exceed a
desired level. The chance constraints were reformulated using
an analytical approach, which leads to an optimization problem
with SOC constraints. To be able to handle the problem
computationally, we developed a sequential SOCP algorithm.
With this solution algorithm, we are able to solve the IEEE 118
bus case including contingency constraints and 99 uncertain
loads within a few minutes on a laptop. The solutions obtained
for the IEEE 118 bus system show that the use of corrective
control actions in reaction to uncertainty reduces operational
cost, without reducing the level of security in the system. The
cost reduction is more significant for cases where we want
to achieve a low violation probability, or where the level of
uncertainty is higher.
We also demonstrate the scalability of the method by
presenting results for the IEEE 300 bus test system and the
Polish grid with 2383 buses. One main bottleneck of the
current implementation is the evaluation of the SOC terms,
but we believe a better implementation and parallelization will
allow for significant speed up of this part.
In the case study, we observed that the PSTs and HVDC
react similarly to fluctuations that are located close to each
other, implying that geographically close fluctuations could
be aggregated. With this type aggregations, coupled with the
fact that even large transmission systems only have few active
contraints, we believe that the proposed CC-SCOPF is scalable
to even larger systems with hundreds of uncertain variables.
In addition to further scalability tests and improvements on
the current implementation, future work will explore the
extension to a full AC power flow, with approximate chance
constraints based on a linearization of the power flow around
the forecasted operating point [32].
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